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Abstract: Due to the increasing security issues recently developed in and outside the EU a 
common transnational answer to these issues is needed. In June 2016 an answer was provided 
in the form of the European Global Strategy but is this the real answer for European collaboration 
in security? Is any real common EU strategy even possible without a common strategic culture 
that provides the context wherein policy choices are made? This thesis topic has relevance within 
the scientific debate around the possibility of an EU that serves as a security provider, particularly 
in the current era characterized by (home grown) terrorism, destabilized neighbouring regions and 
rising populism. This thesis researches the evaluation (if any) of a European strategic culture by 
the analysis of the main strategic EU documents, namely the European Security Strategy (ESS), 
the European Global Strategy (EUGS) and its related key policy documents. These documents 
lay out the plans for EU security and defence collaboration but do they incite the formation of a 
strategic culture? The presented strategic documents are researched and compared using 
document analysis on the basis of Biava, Herd and Drent’s provided Strategic Culture analytical 
framework. This document analysis will help to place the conducted expert interviews (n=9) that 
sketch the drafting process of the ESS and EUGS in perspective. These interviews are conducted 
with in particular Dutch experts in the field divided through two main branches: Policy Making 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, EU) and Think Thank.  
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Introduction: the need for an European Global Strategy? 
  
“Wir Europäer müssen unser Schicksal wirklich in die eigene Hand nehmen.  Es müsse natürlich 
bei der Freundschaft zu den USA und Großbritannien bleiben. Aber wir müssen wissen, wir 
müssen selber für unser Schicksal kämpfen" Angela Merkel – 29-05-2017 
 
At the start of this century the European Union (EU) project seemed to be heading towards a 
promising future thanks to its well-functioning single market, monetary union and the emergence 
of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Two decades later it seems the EU has not 
progressed towards the bright prospects as perceived at start of the 21st century. The EU is 
currently involved in three crises of sovereignty: a money, a border and a security and defence 
crisis (Howorth, J. 2016. p. 389). Additionally to these crises, other recent developments have 
also seemingly eroded the fundamentals of European Integration, namely. the Brexit vote of last 
June, rising populist politics promoting Euroscepticism in the member states, and the Ukraine 
crisis, exemplary of Russia’s readiness to achieve their national interests. This troubling context 
in which the EU finds itself has made observers describe EU’s plight as a ‘Perfect Storm’ (Krop, 
M. Clingendael. 10-5-2017). The above quote of the German Bonds chancellor Angela Merkel 
can therefore be seen as an example of one of the key member state’s wishes for the EU, but 
also that at this time not all necessary factors are present to fulfil those wishes. Factors such as 
political will, shared understanding, and a shared sense of urgency to really undertake action on 
European security collaboration are consequently required in order to fulfil these wishes. The 
question remains, do the two European security strategies lay the foundation for a shared 
European strategic culture where in these factors thrive? 
 
This thesis focuses upon one of the EU’s three current crises, namely the security and defence 
crisis. An illustration of this crisis is the substantial terrorist threat in the EU, especially after the 
attacks in Paris, Brussels and recently Manchester. These attacks caused extensive damage and 
are prominently present in the EU’s collective memory. Other uncertainties are the ambivalent 
policies of president Trump in regards to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
question of whether America even still wants to function as the EU’s security guarantor. These 
issues increase the sense of urgency for European self-reliance in defence and security matters 
(Clingendael, 2016. p.15). Together with the belief that the EU was encircled by an ‘arc of 
instability’, which also affected the stability of the EU itself, a revision of the European strategy 
and security policy was highly needed (Koenders, B. 2015 & EUGS. EC. 2016. p. 4).  
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The result was a request of the European Council to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative 
of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), to draft in consultation with 
the member states a new EU strategy for foreign and security policy (The Hague Institute for 
Global Justice. 2016. p. 2).  
 
With this request, the entirety of the EU’s foreign and security policy was back on the policy 
drafting table for revision until last June when the European Global Strategy (EUGS) was 
published. However, throughout the history of EU integration, security policy already has been 
institutionalized within a number of treaties and policies. However, the degree of urgency awarded 
to this issue has been fluctuating. To illustrate these historical developments a short introduction 
of EU foreign and security strategy integration is described later in this paper. The starting point 
of the EU’s current security policy was in the signing of the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
stipulated the establishment of the ESDP.  In 2003, Europe’s security policy shifted towards a 
more strategic policy with the drafting of the European Security Strategy (ESS), wherein key 
security issues and their political implications were identified. Since then, there has not been a 
total revision of the EU strategy, with only a partial revision in 2008 with the Treaty of Lisbon, 
when the ESDP became the Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP) and received a higher 
priority label (Keulere & Delreux. 2015. p. 172).  
 
These past efforts were intended to shape the EU into a more self-reliant, responsible, capable 
and assertive security actor within the international community (ESS. EC. 2013. p. 11-12). Despite 
these policies, the EU finds itself in an increasingly unstable and insecure situation vis-à-vis its 
neighbouring regions. With the Western Balkans, seemingly on the brink of returning to political 
and ethnic division and persistent instability in the Sahel region as latest examples. Despite these 
security threats, the EU’s CSDP policy until now still does not deliver the multilateral defence 
collaboration that meets the requirements it stipulated (Clingendael 2016. p. 3). These 
disappointing deliverables from the European Security Strategy and the CDSP is partly awarded 
to the fact that the EU is hampered in taking action in defence collaboration due to the variety of 
strategic cultures that its member states represent (De France, O. & Witney, N. 2013. p.1). Can 
the European foreign & security strategy really be effective if 26 (28 minus England and Denmark) 
member states have a different strategic culture and do the strategic policy contribute in forming 
a strategic culture?  
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In this thesis, the question of whether the EU actually has developed a common strategic culture 
over the last ten years wherein the ESS and EUGS has been published is researched with the 
following guiding research question: 
 
‘Has the EU developed from the ESS to the EUGS a Common Strategic Culture?’ 
 
If this is the case, it perhaps could ease the path to powerful comprehensive security collaboration 
in the EU.  The goal of this thesis is to map out the evolution of the EU strategic culture with the 
help of key strategic documents to determine if a common strategic culture can be spoken of.  
As described above the urgency for this real collaboration is more relevant than ever concerning 
the instability in and surrounding Europe.  
 
The following section describes the historical context of EU strategy-making and defence 
collaboration by identifying its main developments, to clearly comprehend the foundations of key 
events in EU-security and defence integration. To further identify EU strategy, the underlying 
theoretical approach applicable to this topic, the concepts of strategy, strategic culture theory 
and constructivism is further explained. Subsequently the methodology and methods are 
addressed to outline how the research question is answered via document analysis and 
interviews. Eventually the analysis of the ESS, EUGS and key documents is outlined to be able to 
reflect on development of EU strategic culture incited by the strategic policies. Finally, with the 
use of the expert interviews a reflection on the drafting processes and the practice of EU strategy 
is analysed and discussed.  
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Literature review: Historical background EU defence and security integration 
 
How did EU security and defence integration come about and what is the core of the development 
of EU strategic culture? The process of identifying new threats, the requirements for their 
subsequent implementation in an institutional capacity and capability to manage these threats 
within the CSDP framework is, according Biava, Drent and Herd 2011, a key driver of EU strategic 
culture development. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the CSDP section of the EU strategies also 
because of the general belief that the EU is setting a higher priority for the development of the 
EU’s “hard” security capabilities next to its already existing soft-power instruments (Biava, A. 
Drent, M. & Herd, G. P. 2011. p. 10). Although the CSDP is the most recent policy framework of 
the EU’s defence and security policies, it is also a product of a long history of defence and security 
integration, which started in the 1950’s. The CSDP currently represents the part of the EU 
strategies that (should) provide on ‘the operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets’ 
that contribute to ‘missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter’ (Missiroli, A. 2016. P. 45). The following section briefly addresses the historical context 
of the EU’s defence and security integration, to clearly sketch the key developments around EU 
defence and security integration. A clear overview is important because of the complexity of the 
institutional context. This complexity is mainly caused by the incremental way of policy-making 
within the EU, considering that there is no agreed upon design made in advance where all policy 
efforts perfectly fit into, due to the evolution of policies over time (Missiroli, A. 2016. p. 6). 
 
The aftermath of the Second World War made clear that European states urgently needed to 
cooperate to ensure that another outburst of violence was prevented. The US was extensively 
involved with Europe’s reconstruction after the devastation of the war due to the Marshall aid plan 
(1947). Within the Marshall plan, the concept of ‘European Self-Reliance’ was an important 
condition that envisioned European integration on a broad scale. This concept envisioned the 
maintenance of peace by dint of integration, creating a greater interdependence between 
European states that would discourage these states from inciting conflict (Keukeleire & Delreux, 
2014. p. 34-36). A maintained order of peace and security in Europe could ensure that the US 
would eventually be able to withdrawal as Europe’s security guarantor (Keukeleire & Delreux, 
2014. p. 34). The 1951 signed Paris Treaty formally institutionalized EU integration with the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which radically altered the way Europe conducted 
interstate affairs and conflict resolution (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 37-38).  
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The end of the Second World War and the start of European integration did not necessarily 
eliminate all possible security threats for Europe. The Cold War between the Soviet Union (SU) 
and the US evoked growing discrepancies between the Eastern and Western ideologies, thereby 
increasing distrust and warlike tensions. To jointly face Cold War threats, Western liberal and 
democratic states established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.  With the 
concept of collective defence enshrined in article 5 of the treaty, NATO was informally perceived 
as the US’s security guarantee for Europe (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 39). For the US, the 
concept of ‘European Self-Reliance’ remained an important condition for European integration 
thus the US kept pushing for intensified European defence efforts. In response to this request, 
the European Defence Community (EDC) was established in 1952. The EDC was to include a 
common EU defence budget and institutionalize a trans-national European military force. This, 
however, never became reality due to the improvement in East-West relations and the vote 
against the EDC from the General Assembly in France, that decided to not ratify the treaty as 
states feared losing sovereignty (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40). This development kept EU 
defence policy from taking place within the framework of NATO. Consequently, any further effort 
to institutionalize supranational EU defence integration became a taboo subject, mainly over 
concerns of compromising member states’ sovereign right to determine their own military forces.  
(Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40; Rogers, J. 2009. p. 841).  
 
Other efforts to integrate European defences were taking place but as described before within 
the NATO framework: a prime example is the Western European Union (WEU), stipulated in the 
1954 Brussels Treaty and primarly reliant on NATO military capabilities and hence not a 
framework for European self-reliant defence cooperation (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40; 
Rogers, J. 2009. p. 841).  Transatlantic ties intensified over the decades partly due to Europe’s 
dependence on US defence capabilities. This dependence kept European defence integration off 
the policy drafting table (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40). However, sentiments regarding 
European defence integration changed in reaction to the EU’s lack of military capabilities to 
contribute towards conflict resolution during the Balkan wars (Fiott, D. in Missiroli, A. 2016, p.10). 
Awareness of the importance of a sufficient crisis response power and common military 
capabilities grew within the EU. In 1993, the Maastricht treaty formulated an answer to this by 
instating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40). 
The CFSP was modified after the establishment of the treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Saint-
Malo agreement (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40) in order to launch the ESDP as an integral 
and operational part of CFSP and to establish the HR/SG office that has been e responsible for 
the coordination of external relations for the European Council (Missiroli, A. 2016, p.14 -18).  
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This step toward further integration was made possible due to the fact that some areas of tension 
between the EU member states had been balanced out, namely: the tension between European 
Integration-focused member states and Transatlantic-focused member states; and the tension 
between civilian power-focused member states and Military power-focused member states 
(Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 52). These areas of tensions are quite similar to Howorth’s (2002) 
formulation of divergence in national strategic cultures (Howorth, J. 2002. p.92).  These above 
developments created the conditions for independent EU security and defence collaboration but 
also show where the bottlenecks are in creating strategic coherence in the EU (Biava, et al. 2011. 
p.5). 
 
The 2001 terrorist attacks in the US,  its resulting geostrategic shocks especially invoked by the 
Iraq war and its ramifications regarding global security evoked a renewed sense of urgency to 
revise the EU’s external policies, especially given the incipient enlargement of the EU in 2000, 
with the addition of 9 new member states These external and internal developments caused for 
an overhaul of basic foreign policy objectives, principles and the formulation of key security threats 
in the form of the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003. In this new geostrategic 
context, the initial EU strategy for the first time described an overall approach and a new position 
for the EU to tackle new security threats (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 60). As addressed in the 
introduction, the second latest key European defence integration development was the Lisbon 
Treaty that changed the ESDP into the CSDP (Missiroli, A. 2016 p. 16). The Lisbon Treaty also 
changed the role of the HR/SG into the HR/VP that would now function as the face and the voice 
of the EU’s external policy of the European Council and European Commission.  Additionally, the 
European External Action Service was established which the HR/VP would also coordinate 
(Missiroli, A. 2016. p. 27). The figures below provide a short overview of key dates in European 
Foreign Policy Planning mentioned here above.  
S1794590 
 
 10 
 
 (made in Prezi based on Keukeleire & Delreux. 2014. p. 36-37) 
 
The Lisbon Treaty instigated a framework for European defence integration, offering a supposedly 
comprehensive approach with more priority. This resulted in an increase in deployment of 
European military and civilian missions (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 172). The functioning of 
these missions, however, relies on voluntary contributions and is not necessarily related to 
territorial defence. This practice makes the CSDP subject to the political will and perspectives of 
member states (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 195). Does this mean that the CSDP within the 
EU strategy is not merely than the sum of its part, dancing to the tune of the member states 
political will?  The CDSP structure infographic below provides brief information about the 
functioning and key elements/players within the CSDP framework. Political will concerning 
security and defence is largely influenced by the various strategic cultures of the EU member 
states causing differences in their preferred approaches (France de, O. & Withney, H. 2013. p. 
2). The inability to really provide the comprehensive approach and abilities it promises is partly 
attributed to the diversity of strategic cultures in the EU (Clingendael, 2016; France de, O. & 
Withney, H. 2013. Biava, A. et al. 2011. p.3). This thesis researches if an EU strategic culture has 
been developed over the last ten years.  
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10/05/2017
1
§ Agency that assists 
member states in 
improving defence
capabilities in support of 
the CSDP
§ Meets at the level of 
defence ministers
§ Fosters defence
cooperation among 
member states (except 
Denmark)
§ Including cooperation in 
research and technology, 
procurement or training, 
armaments cooperation 
and strengthen European 
defence, technological 
and industrial base
EDA 
§ Highest military body 
within the Council
§ Meets at the level of 
Chiefs of Defence of 
the Member States
§ Provides the PSC 
with advise and 
recommendations on 
military matters 
EUMCXxx Xxx xXx xxxxxx xxxxx
§ Preparatory body for 
the Council of the EU
§ Meets at 
ambassadorial level
§ Keeping track of the 
International situation 
§ Helps define  policise
within the CSFP and 
CSDP
§ It prepares a 
coherent EU crisis 
response
§ Exercise  political and 
strategic direction of 
crisis response
PSC
• Responsible for an 
autonomous 
operational conduct 
of civilian CSDP 
operations
• Under political and 
strategic direction of 
the PSC
• Ensures the effective 
planning and 
conduct of civilian 
CSDP crisis 
management 
operations, as well as 
the proper 
implementation of all 
mission-related tasks
CPCC & CMPD
Introduction - CSDP structure
• Responsible for the 
shaping and carrying 
out of the EU foreign 
and security policy  
(CFSP and CSDP)
• Since treaty of Lisbon 
also Vice-President 
of the European 
Commission thus 
responsible for trade, 
development, 
neighborhood policy, 
and humanitarian 
aid.
• Building consensus 
between the 28 EU 
member states and 
their respective 
priorities
• Representing the EU 
internationally
HR/VP
Webpage European External Action Service, 2017, Viewed 10-05-2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_ar
Organisation chart CSDP structure 
European External Action Service
Higher Representative/ Vice 
President (HR/VP) –
Frederica Mogherini
Chair Political 
Security 
Committee (PSC)
EU Military Staff (EUMS) 
Director General - E. 
Pulkinnen
Secretary General 
(SG)   H. Schmid
Chair EU Military 
Committee (EUMC)
M. Kostarakos
DSG-POL
Deputy Secretary 
General for political 
affairs, Political 
Director J.C. Belliard
DSG-CSDPCR
Deputy Secretary 
General for CSDP 
and crisis response
P. Serrano 
European Defence
Agency (EDA) 
J. Domecq
Crisis Management 
and Planning 
(CMPD) - Director
G. Iklody
Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability  
(CPCC) – Director   
K. Deane 
The Politico Military 
Group (PMG)
Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(made in PowerPoint based on EEAS website: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en 
referred at 9-05-2017) 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
This section provides an insight in which theoretical framework is used to find an answer on the 
question whether the EU developed an common strategic culture. This framework is chosen to 
analyse the strategic policies and the interviews because the policies ought to represent the EU 
strategy. Therefore, the concept of strategy and strategic culture theory is addressed. 
Constructivism is a logical addition to the theoretical framework because this thesis researches 
culture which is a concept strongly related to constructivism that focuses on the cultural, historical 
and social constructed aspects of international relations.  
 
Strategy and Strategic Culture Theory 
 
Firstly, the concept of strategy and strategic culture needs to be addressed in order to answer 
two questions: do different strategic cultures in the EU hamper action on foreign and security 
policy?; and has a common EU strategic culture been developed over the last 10 years? Strategy 
is used in multiple ways in different fields of work. Below, the concept of strategy relevant for this 
thesis is elaborated upon.    
 
Strategy is within international relations defined in multiple ways and has evolved over time.  From 
the well-known first authors such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, who described strategy from a 
merely military perspective, to more contemporary authors such as Gray, Betts and Ortmann & 
Whittaker, who have expanded the concept to a more extensive application.  In on War, 
Clausewitz defines strategy as ‘the use of engagements for the object of war’ (Clausewitz, C. 
1976. p. 178). Gray subsequently expands this strict operational-orientated definition by pointing 
out that ‘engagements’ could be understood in different ways, and therefore broadens the 
applicability of the concept. The expanded definition of strategy is explained by Gray in the 
following way; ‘the use of tacit and explicit threats, as well as of actual battles and campaigns, to 
advance political purposes’ (Clausewitz, C. 1976. p. 178). It is however not bound by only the 
use of military instruments, but ‘engagements’ that can be understood in the sense of all ‘relevant 
instruments of power as threat or in action, for the objectives of statecraft’ (Gray, C.S. 1999. p. 
17). Ultimately, Gray defines strategy as; ‘The use that is made of force and threat of force for the 
ends of policy’ (Gray, C.S. 1999. p. 17).  
 
S1794590 
 
 13 
This eventual definition according to Gray should be understood as grand strategy instead of 
solely military strategy because of the broad conception of ‘engagements’ that do not necessarily 
have to be military means.  Betts’ perspective on strategy is more military focused according the 
following definition: ‘a plan for using military means to achieve political ends’ (Betts, R.K. 2000. 
p. 6). This is an example of a parochial concept of strategy focused on force and the variety of 
threats of force employed to achieve political objectives. Grand strategy prescribes a more 
complex and comprehensive understanding of strategy.   For this thesis both explanations of 
strategy (grand strategy and military strategy) are relevant because of the comparison of the EU’s 
two grand strategies on foreign affairs and security, wherein a broad range of policy areas are 
addressed and a comprehensive approach is emphasized (Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 10).  
 
Within International Relations, grand strategy is understood as a state’s plan to achieve its national 
interests in the global area via the prioritization of various aspects of policy. In light of these 
interests and priorities, grand strategy prescribes the economic, military and diplomatic 
instruments that are to be used to ensure or protect these interests (Ortmann, S & Whittaker, N. 
2011. p.300).  A grand strategy therefore helps to provide the context wherein difficult political 
decisions are made about resources and power projection. Another comprehensive definition of 
the role of grand strategy is provided by Basil H. Liddell Hart; ‘The role of grand strategy is – 
higher strategy – is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation or of a band of nations, 
towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy’ 
(Hart, B.H.L 1967. p. 322). Strategy however can essentially be brought back to the fact that a 
nation's (grand) strategy should help to achieve national interests by mapping with which 
instrument it should play to engage in zero-sum transactions on the international stage.  Ortmann 
and Whittaker emphasise this realist character of grand strategy wherein states are the highest 
authority within a system that is determined by mutual competition and power struggle (Ortmann, 
S & Whittaker, N. 2011. p.304).  The problem with this interpretation of grand strategy in relation 
with the EU is twofold;  
1. The EU is not one nation state that has to answer to a clearly demarcated 
constituency, as it is comprised of 26 member states (in the area of EU external 
relation policy) and split between its two principal institutions (the European Council 
and the European Commission) which both have a voice regarding security policy. 
The CSDP is an intergovernmental framework, and therefore to maintain its legitimacy, 
it would never become a centralised supranational authority due to sovereignty issues 
(Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 4). 
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2. The decentralized political structure of the EU means that the executive authority that 
decides over means and ends of security policy are the member states, meaning that 
progress on decision-making can be made difficult if a consensus is not achieved.  
(Baun, 2005; Toje, 2005, p. 10 in Biava, A. et al. P. 2011. p. 5).  
 
Yet there are authors that question the solely realist nature of strategy and strategic behaviour. 
This idea started to gain ground during the Cold War where the two major powers of the US and 
the SU opposed each other with vast differences in ideology. International Relations scholars 
such as Jack Snyder (1977) started to publish about the idea that culture can influence strategic 
behaviour (Poore, S. 2003. p. 279). This idea emerged because of the difference approaches in 
strategy between the SU and the US seemingly caused by a difference in ‘national styles in 
strategy’ (Booth, K. 1979. p. 114). Snyder argued that “by identifying these historical and 
organizational factors, the strategic culture approach attempts to explain the origins and 
continuing vitality of attitudes and behaviour that might otherwise seem to American observers 
inscrutable, wrong-headed, or peculiar,” implying that the behaviour of the individual is influenced 
and socialized due to cultural factors (Snyder, J.L. 1977.p. 5). The general definition of strategic 
culture is “the set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual 
behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best 
way to achieve it (Klein, 1991: Duffield, 1999 in Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 2).  
 
Constructivism prescribes that social reality is ultimately founded upon culture, and constructed 
upon the power of ideas, knowledge, norms and resulting rules that eventually shape states’ 
identities (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 150). Building on that explanation 
strategic culture can be defined as the socially constructed framework wherein strategic 
discussion and choices are made. This is different from Snyder’s conception, which strongly 
linked strategic culture with strategic behaviour by claiming that strategic culture determines 
behaviour due to cultural, ideational and normative influences (Johnston, 1999). Gray describes 
strategic culture as the context that shapes strategic behaviour besides other material forces that 
also shape behaviour (political, geography, balance of power and structure of international 
system) (Gray, 1999). The framework is determined by culture consisting of historic, political 
structural, technologic, defence organizational and geographic factors (Lantis, J.S. & Howlet, D. 
2011. p. 87). A strategic culture therefore prescribes a nation's political morale that consequently 
determines a nation's principal beliefs regarding democracy, individual freedom, security etc. 
(Lantis, J.S. & Howlet, D. 2011. p. 86).  
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The above interpretation of strategic culture essentially shows how culture is the context that 
shapes the processes of strategic thinking, choices and eventually strategy making (Gray, C.S. 
1999. p. 55). Considering this it seems that a shared strategic culture therefore is essential for 
the successful formation and implementation of grand strategy, the basis of the concept lies 
within the realm of the state. The state, in strategy-making, has to formulate ‘state interest’ and 
national decisions regarding power projection.  The political identity of states is what the concept 
of grand strategy (partially) ignores, while on the contrary the concept of strategic culture 
centralizes political identity.  
 
The importance of a shared strategic culture and political identity seem to be key for successful 
strategy making. However, strategic norms and values are also influenced by changing threat 
perception (Meyer, C.O. p.14). Especially when there is a rising amount of perceived threats, the 
more deep and resilient norms will be concerning protective and strategic measures against these 
threats (Meyer, C.O. p.14). According to Meyer especially the norms in regards to goals and 
cooperation with the use of force are affected. It depends which type of threats are perceived as 
urgent but a stronger regard to (military) alliances as the only answer to the more powerful threats 
is a possibility (Meyer, C.O. p.14). 
 
Nonetheless the fact that strategic culture is an under-researched concept, in the methodology 
section an operationalization of strategic culture and analytical framework is address to elaborate 
how it is researched within this thesis (Poore, 2003. p. 279; Meyer, C.O. p.2). 
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Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is understood as a reaction to Neoliberalism and Realism, as Constructivism 
criticizes some of the core assumptions and ‘features’ of both of these grand theories. 
Constructivism rejects the assumption within (neo-)realism and (neo-)liberalism that social reality 
is a given which never alters and that states have fixed interests in power and wealth (Barnett, M. 
in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 150). These main interests are informed by factors like 
geography, distribution of power and military force, material factors which effectively determine 
the behaviour of states (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 150-151). Within 
these ‘traditional’ approaches the assumption that state behaviour and interests are defined by 
ideas and norms is not workable.  
 
Constructivism proposes an alternative approach that ‘believes’ that social reality (and therefore 
society) is constructed and shaped through the interpretation of language, ideas, norms, rules 
social identities and processes of learning (Snyder, J. 2004. p. 55). The school of Constructivism 
was developed in the 1980’s as a part of the growing interest in social, cultural and identity theory 
which was initiated by the end of the cold war (Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. 2007. p. 3). Constructivism 
is founded on the work of theorists like Wendt, Katzenstein, Adler, Wendt & Duvall (among many 
others) that all contested the dominant core assumptions of structuralist approaches like (Neo-
)Realism, (Neo-)Liberalism and Marxism (Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. 2007. p. 3).  Within the school of 
Constructivism, the notion developed that the structure of international politics constructs the 
identities and interests of states, (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 151) which 
are not necessarily fixed structures, but transformable by interpretations, global-historical forces, 
non-state actors and societies that influence individuals (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, 
P. 2011. p. 152 & Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. 2007. p. 3).   
 
Constructivism assumes that institutions have a role in shaping this behaviour through the shared 
norms and values that these institutions represent, which, as a result, forms institutionalized 
socialization.  (Risse, T. 2004. p. 147; Meyer, C.O. p. 18). This stands in contradiction with the 
prescriptions of (neo-)realism and (neo-)liberalism, as Constructivism prioritizes ideational factors 
such as norms, values and identities over material factors. Ideational factors and their influence 
on patterns of socialization determine the perception of a state’s capacity for power (Snyder, J. 
2004. p. 60-61).  As Wendt (1992) states “Anarchy is what states make of it,” thus international 
relations are not de facto governed by the structure of the global system but rather upon how 
states perceive each other (Wendt, A. 1992. pp.391–425).  
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Constructivism is a prescriptive approach to exploring the EU’s common strategic culture by its 
focus upon the ideas, norms and identities that underpin state behaviour, and the manner in 
which these factors are enshrined and communicated via language and rhetoric.   Through the 
analysis of language, patterns that can be connected to ideas, beliefs and identity within an 
institution can be identified that indicate how the institution perceives the world, itself and its 
stakeholders (Klotz,A. & Lynch, C.  2007 p.21). Furthermore, through the use of the qualitative 
methods of interview and document analysis, the development of strategic culture in the EU can 
be outlined. The close examination of official EU strategies and documents that communicate the 
political and strategic goals of its institutions allows the study of the EU’s strategic culture. 
Constructivism is the suitable approach to serve this study of the EU’s strategic culture because 
it recognizes that institutions are shaped by shifting ideational factors and in turn, have a 
socializing power (Meyer, C.O. p. 17-18.. This stands in contradiction with structuralist theories 
(Realism and Liberalism) that disregard historical context, social identity and the interests of 
member state governments and societies (Risse, T. 2004. p. 146).  In order to place this analysis 
within the broader domain of IR, academia concerning the historical context of EU security and 
defence cooperation has been reviewed above.  
 
With the theoretical framework based upon strategic culture theory and constructivism, the 
argument concerning the question if the EU developed a common strategic culture is that over 
time the EU should have formed a common strategic culture due to the considerable amount of 
security and defence policy making in the EU. Policies that represent shared strategic ideas, 
norms and practices which eventually should foster collaboration. These policies on their turn 
should institutionalize these shared ideas, norms and practices that ultimately establishes a 
common strategic culture (Meyer, C.O. p. 17-18. The initial fascination in regards to EU defence 
and security collaboration is as mentioned before because there are a broad range of policy 
guidelines but in practice these policies do not seem to be carried out as they are intended. 
  
 
Methodology & Methods 
 
How can the development of EU strategic culture in the last 13 years be mapped and uncovered? 
This section addresses the methodology and methods used to answer the question: ‘Has the EU 
developed from the ESS to the EUGS a Common Strategic Culture?’.  
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Strategic Culture Operationalized 
 
In this section, the pillars of strategic culture are described in order to operationalize the concept 
of strategic culture. In the theoretical framework, several definitions of strategic culture have been 
expounded. From Snyder to Gray to the most recent characterizations from Biava et al, the 
common denominator of these definitions is the broad view on culture encompassing everything 
from beliefs, ideas, history, norms, habits of mind, assumptions and worldviews (Snyder, 1977; 
Gray,1999; Lantis, J.S. & Howlet, D. 2011; Klein, 1991: Duffield, 1999 in Biava, A. et al. 2011). 
The eventual definition by Biava, Drent and Herd inspired by the Meyer definition of 2006 is the 
best fit for exploring the EU strategies due to the ESS’ and EUGS’ multi-faceted character 
(multilateral and comprehensive approach): ‘Strategic culture comprises the identity-derived 
norms, ideas and behaviour about what is appropriate and legitimate concerning the use of 
military and civilian instrument for security goals’ (Biava, A. et al. p.8. 2011).  
 
Within this definition, four drivers of the EU’s strategic culture are identified by Biava et al (2011. 
p. 9). These drivers represent the operationalisation of Strategic Culture that is used to analyse 
both of the EU strategies and the CSDP key documents to the ESS and EUGS considered in this 
research.  
(Biava et al. 2011. p. 9, p. 11) 
1. “The EU’s recognition of new threats and the subsequent adaption of its institutional 
capacity and capability to address the threats and then the political will to launch CSDP 
operations”.  
2. “The operations themselves and the learning process they engender (lessons identified 
and learned)”.  
3. “The shared norms with regards to using appropriate instruments, military force included, 
to tackle security challenges, and the processes by which these norms are 
institutionalized”.  
4. “The common development understanding and convergence of CSDP norms around an 
increasingly more robust strategic culture that links the use of force within a more 
comprehensive toolbox of policy instruments with both civilian and military aspects of 
CSDP”. 
Despite the variety of definitions of strategic culture, the concept is under-conceptualized (Poore, 
2003. p.283), thus a limited number of analytical frameworks are available to choose from in order 
to analyse strategic culture (Poore, 2003. p. 284).   
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Biava, et al (2011. p.15) provided on the basis of the four strategic culture drivers an indicative 
analytical framework, which they used to research the EU’s strategic culture up to including 2011. 
Which not to mention also was designed for further research, this thesis therefore expands the 
framework up to and including the EUGS (Biava, A. et al. p.3. 2011).  
 
Methods 
 
Document analysis & analytical framework  
 
The selection of documents is based on if the documents solely represent the EU’s foreign and 
security strategies. Therefore, only the two ‘real’ strategies of the EU are analysed but related key 
documents that represent the review or the implementation of strategies are also included in the 
research. The ESS and the EUGS are the true key documents that represent the narrative about 
the EU’s identity concerning the internal/external division (Mälksoo, M. 2016. p. 376). The ESS is 
key to comprehended the EU’s understanding of the crucial threats at that time and how they 
should be addressed (Biava, A. et al. p. 9. 2011). The EUGS represents according to Nathalie 
Tocci, the HR/VP’s closest advisor and executive on the document, a two-year process of 
consultation and strategic reflection among member states and EU internally (Tocci, N. 2016. 
p.470). Therefore, both strategies can be understood as the EU’s assessment of self as 
(security/political) actor in relation with its uncertain and ambiguous surrounding. Thus, the ESS 
and EUGS can be read as the EU’s ‘autobiographies’ (Mälksoo, M. 2016. p. 376). The other 
related key documents that represent the review or the implementation of the strategies are also 
included in the research because the strong connection with the initial strategies. 
 
On the basis of Biava et al’s drivers of strategic culture and the indicative analytical framework 
provided in their article the strategies and key documents content are coded on how the drivers 
of strategic culture are represented. Within thesis this he initial framework created by Biava et al 
is updated and adjusted to the current status of EU security and defence policies. The framework 
functions as a tool to map out the drivers of strategic culture and outline the development of 
strategic culture in the last 13 years. The main differences and similarities are discussed in the 
next chapter. The first driver can be linked to the strategic threats section concerned about threat 
perception. The second driver regarding the CSDP operations is taken out of consideration 
because the focus on non-material factors instead of material factors like military force. The third 
driver is connected to the section on shared norms that create ‘legitimacy for acting’. The fourth 
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driver applies to two sections in the analytical framework the military and civilian tool building and 
institutional machinery sections (Biava, A. et al. 2011).   
 
All six documents are coded according the labels in the below table that together represent three 
of the four main drivers of strategic culture. The coding software used is NVivo software that 
supports qualitative and mixed methods research. The analysis from ESS up to the EUGS is 
conducted by first creating the codes in NVivo then a close reading of all six documents and 
attaching the codes to the corresponding content to eventually fill in the sections in the below 
framework. The coded documents are sent in a file accompanied with this thesis.  
 
Year 
Document 
Selection 
Strategic 
guidelines 
(document 
selection) 
‘Framework for 
action 
Coded 
Strategic 
Threats – 
‘Against 
which to 
act’ 
Coded 
Military and 
civilian tool-
building – 
‘Capability 
to act’ 
Coded 
Institutional 
Machinery – 
‘Capacity to 
act/to decide 
to act’ 
Coded 
Norms – 
‘Legitimacy 
for acting’ 
2003 ESS     
- 2008 
ESS implementation 
review     
2016 EUGS     
- 2016 
Implementation plan 
on security and 
defence (SDIP)     
- 2016 
European Defence 
Action Plan (EDAP)     
- 2016 
Implementation EU-
NATO joint 
declaration      
(based on Biava, A. et al. 2011. p.15) 
 
Interviews 
 
The interviews that are conducted with experts in the field of European strategy making and 
implementation are an important source of data to discover the daily practice concerning the 
creation of the ESS and EUGS. Interviews are a qualitative research method that provide insight 
into the attitudes, values and opinions of individuals to understand how the individuals understand 
and operate within the world (Silverman, 1993, p. 167). 
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Important to note here is that data obtained from interviews are less objective/natural data than 
data obtained from the document analysis of key EU strategy documents. However, the 
interviews bring the necessary depth and exclusive insight into the process of EU strategy making 
and the EU’s strategic culture, especially given that such a direct method of analysis can provide 
answers reflective of the current political climate among policymakers within the EU.  The stages 
of the EU strategy-making are being addressed to eventually describe and trace the process of 
the ESS and EUGS from its inception to the present day. Some respondents requested that their 
quotes are referred to their function and not to their full name. This will mean that some quotes 
will appear without the name of the respondent. 
 
The interviews have a semi-structured design, enabling the research to yield more information 
about the topics addressed or deviate from the set themes. This means that during the interview 
it is possible to improvise and provides the respondent the ability to lead the discussion.  See the 
appendix for the latest version of the topic list, the topic list has been adjusted after the first 
interview that served as a pre-test interview. Information is richer, more detailed, focused on 
individuality and the individual experiences within the world (Silverman, 1993, p. 162. In appendix 
A, the topic list with the themes certainly addressed in the expert interviews are described. In 
appendix B, the respondent list with the experts their according background and profession is 
displayed. The expert interviews are divided according to their background in the following way: 
 
 
o Policy (Staff in Brussels and the Netherlands)  
 
o Academic - Think Tank (2x) 
After the interviews were conducted, a short interview report was written, noting any significant 
quotations obtained in order to extract the core message out of every interview. Due to access 
issues and time limitation, the respondents interviewed only represent the Netherlands the 
interviews therefore give a Dutch biased perspective on the processes concerning the ESS and 
EUGS. Nonetheless because of their diverse backgrounds and because the respondents were 
key players in the (Dutch) processes of the ESS and the EUGS and that the Netherlands was a 
key ally in the process a good overview of the process can be traced and described (Tocci, N. 
2016. p. 467). The combination of document analysis and interviews allows an analysis of the 
EUGS and ESS through multiple methods and perspectives strengthening emerging results and 
findings.  
Ministry of Defence (3x) 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2x) 
 
External Action Service & EU (2x) 
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Drivers of Strategic Culture from ESS to EUGS 
 
In this section, the results of the document analysis of the ESS, the EUGS and its related key 
documents are presented and discussed. All six EU strategy and policy documents are analysed 
on three selected drivers of strategic culture that are divided into four labels. In order to discover 
the development of a common EU strategic culture from the ESS up and including the EUGS. An 
important note to make is the that the factor of time is of big influence, the world during publication 
of the ESS is not the same as the world during the publication of the EUGS. For example, the first 
sentence of the ESS about the EU being “never so prosperous secure and free” is to date an 
excuse for policy makers to taunt the credibility of the 2003 strategy (European Council. 2001. 
p.1). Nonetheless, the ESS was the first EU document laying out key threats and creating a 
precedent for EU foreign and security policy.  Another important difference that needs to be 
pointed out is how the two strategy documents differ in length. The ESS consists out of 14 pages 
while the EUGS consists out of 56. It seems that with the EUGS the EU and its member states 
needed four times more space to balance out the areas of tension concerning EU security and 
defence collaboration. However, there is also another reason for this difference that is further 
discussed in the section where experts give an insight into the drafting process of both 
documents.  
 
Strategic Threats – Driver 1  
 
The recognition of threats and the perception of threats are as mentioned a factor that is of 
influence on strategic culture, it can function as a catalyst for defence cooperation (Meyer, O.C. 
2005. p. 14; Biava et al. 2011. p. 9).  The ESS was the EU’s first strategic assessment that 
indicated key threats which covered half the document (see table 1). In the 2008 ESS 
implementation review additional threats were defined to match the new context the EU was in, 
but also to stress that the EU still need to be “more capable, more coherent and more active” 
(European Commission. 2008. p.2). In the EUGS 13 years later there is actually no mention of 
key threats. Instead the document focuses on key priorities supplemented by the definition trans-
national dangers like “terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy 
insecurity” (EU HR/VP. 2016. p.19). These dangers are not elaborated further on in the document. 
The EUGS is instead primarily focused on establishing key priorities and creating a common 
narrative for the EU wherein the words “unity” and “united” are strongly represented (see table 2; 
European Commission. 2017. p. 25). However, in the EUGS follow-up documents strategic 
threats are defined as shown in the table below but never labelled as key threats (see table 2 and 
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3). The base of the EUGS is thus more focused on common priorities than, in the case of the 
ESS, common threats.  
 
Military and Civilian Tool-Building – Driver 4  
 
With this driver, the actual proposed military and civilian tools for the use of force are selected 
out. It is an important driver of strategy and strategic culture because it represents the agreed 
upon means (of force) to address the identified threats (Biava et al. 2011. p.9). As described 
means are a crucial element of strategy.  The main context difference between the ESS and the 
EUGS is that the proposed means of the EUGS are yet to implement. Nonetheless the intention 
of which means to use to achieve the defined policy goals can be made up out of both 
documents. However, the ESS lacks in detailed defined civilian-military tools to tackle the assed 
threats (table 1). Exemplary for this is; “when at that time, the HR/SG Solana was asked by the 
council to implement the ESS he replied that he couldn’t implement it, that was not his aim with 
the ESS” (Tocci, N. personal communication. July 13. 2017). Instead it focal point is creating the 
narrative of a comprehensive approach on the basis of multilateralism and the need for a 
European strategic culture (European Council, 2003. p. 11; table 1). The EUGS is also indented 
to create a narrative mainly focused on unity and action on defence. Because of the emphasis on 
action the suggested civilian and military tools are therefore clearer defined especially in the follow-
up implementation and action documents (table 2 and 3). “It is being said that in the last 2 years 
more has been done on the field of CSDP than the last 10 years” (Tocci, N. personal 
communication. July 13. 2017; European Commission. 2017. p. 20).  
 
Institutional Machinery – Driver 4 
 
This driver is one of the most important factors in fostering a strategic culture. As argued through 
strategic culture theory and constructivism, institutions represent ideas and norms that are 
institutionalized through their practices.  With this driver, the proposed institutional machinery in 
the selected policy documents is identified and altogether this is a representation of the 
framework wherein EU strategic decisions are made in (table 1,2, and 3). According to dr. Nathalie 
Tocci ‘the main institutional success of the ESS was the establishment of the EDA and the 
headline goals’ (Tocci, N. personal communication. July 13. 2017). Another evidently important 
institutional instrument is the European Neighbourhood policy that was funded in the narrative of 
“the importance of a ring of well-governed countries at the border of the EU” (European 
Commission. 2003. p. 7).  
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Nonetheless the institutional machinery presented in the EUGS and its follow-up documents is of 
a vast difference in comparison with the ESS in terms of follow up time and quantity. In one year 
time the EUGS, EDAP and SDIP got published wherein especially the last two documents outlined 
a detailed set of institutional machineries (see table 2).  Which is significantly faster than during 
the ESS. This shows the higher level of priority given to CSDP and the intensity with which the 
institutional framework is modified and designed.  
  
Norms – Driver 2  
 
Norms is the last but presumably the most important driver of strategic culture. This driver 
represents the shared understanding concerning the (institutionalizing) instruments, including use 
of force, that address security issues (Biava et al. 2011. p. 9). As argued norms are a key 
component of the strategic culture wherein decisions are made in  (Klein, 1991: Duffield, 1999 in 
Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 2). The fundamental norms of the EU transcend the topic of strategy 
making and EU defence collaboration. However, these fundamental norms are obviously reflected 
within these policies. The focus on democracy, security, rule of law and multilateralism based 
within the UN system are norms which are inherently linked to the EU. In both strategy documents 
these norms are reaffirmed (see table 1 and table 2). The greatest difference is the change of tone 
in regards to these norms. In the ESS the EU and its norms are presented as a beacon of 
prosperity, development and democracy that spreads its example through enlargement. This 
Eurocentric narrative is toned down and the realization has come to the EU’s mind that space is 
needed for “different regional experiences” and “reciprocal inspiration” (EU HR/VP. 2016. p. 32). 
Another shift in norms is the emphasis on the need for hard power which is according the EUGS 
essential to exert soft power (EU HR/VP. 2016.p. 4; table 2). Therefore, in the first-year emphasis 
was put on a push for the defence and security aspect of the EUGS (European Commission. p. 
6). This resulted in the EDAP, SDIP and the joint declaration NATO-EU. All these three documents 
are in line with the presented norms in the EUGS (see table 2 and 3).   
 
As a whole all these above described drivers are present in the analysed policy documents. 
Components of strategic culture are thus represented throughout the era of strategy making in 
the EU. Main differences are shift of eurocentrism, detailed proposed instruments to reach policy 
goals and the pace wherein policy is made. The following section will provide an insight in the 
practice behind the analysed documents and explain how these differences arose.    
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Expert insight in ESS & EUGS   
 
After exploring the theoretical and policy aspect of strategy making this section addresses the 
practice of the ESS and EUGS. By interviewing nine experts in the field an insight is gained into 
the drafting process and the views on EU strategy making and CSDP.  
 
Drafting process 
The ESS drafting process was one behind closed doors without a broad consultation among all 
the member states, civil society and EU institutions; “Everyone agreed that a strategy needed to 
be drafted, but it was a great challenge to get everyone on the same page. Solana solved that 
trough writing the strategy with a very select group and asses only with key member states the 
important points and bottlenecks” (Osch, T. personal communication. June 12. 2017). This 
resulted in the fact that smaller member states felt that all of a sudden, the EU strategy was 
established. This process of a very select assessment without consultation rounds did not favour 
the support for the ESS. “Also at the time of the 2008 implementation review the process was 
the same as in 2003 without any consultation rounds” (Osch, T. personal communication. June 
12. 2017). However, according to mr. van Aubel it is important to take in mind that this process 
was also possible because the different age in 2003. As described in the introduction the pressure 
for the EU to act as security actor nowadays is higher: “Because of threats outside Europe 
becoming increasingly intertwined with internal and external security and world positions are 
changing. Others are not going to solve these problems for us, the position of the EU is also 
changing, which is because of the changing world order. Besides being an economic actor the 
EU also needs to be a security and political player” (van Aubel. J.P. personal communication. 
June 22. 2017). 
 
During the EUGS the drafting process was entirely different with points of contacts in every 
member state, numerous rounds of consultations per chapter of the EUGS and a broad external 
outreach (Tocci, N. 2016. P 463-466). This was also affirmed by the different government officials 
that were interviewed for this research. Between the EU and the member states was a strong 
commitment and good cooperation but also between the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Staaij, W., Earle. G. Camerik, L. personal communication. June 2, June 8, June 
30. 2017. This inclusive and extensive process eventually fostered the positive reception and 
readiness for action in regards to the EUGS. Illustrative for this is the following quote: “The big 
advantage of the EUGS was that we were involved from start to finish. Including the member 
states that were somewhat more doubtful. … The level of involvement and agreement in regards 
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to the EUGS in particular on defence and security has been politically outlined through the drafting 
process of the EUGS” (Claringbould, S. personal communication. June 21. 2017). According to 
Mrs. Earle from the Ministry of Defence and responsible for CSDP implementation in the 
Netherlands; “Now it will not depend on the EU, but on the member states. It is their turn to act” 
(Earle. G. personal communication. June 8. 2017) 
 
Several respondents also highlighted the fact how the ESS was merely a threat assessment than 
a strategy. As described the majority of the ESS was focused on security and describing the 
threats. The described means in the ESS that should address those threats are vaguely 
elaborated. On the other hand, the aim for the EUGS was to be a grand strategy that transcends 
the subject of security and defence, covers global topics and unites the EU. Thus, a more 
extensive writing process is inevitable and that is also one of the reasons why the EUGS had 
more pages to fill. PMG chair van Aubel affirmed this in the interview the following way “Where in 
2003 we solely focused on security, we are now aiming for a global strategy that is broader than 
security and defence. That focuses on economy, reconstruction and conflict prevention instead 
of resolution” (van Aubel. J.P. personal communication. June 22. 2017).  
 
View on strategic culture 
 
The view on the development of a EU strategic culture by the experts is quite consistent, which 
is that the EU is still at the initial phase of forming a strategic culture. In the last 13 years, the first 
concrete steps to institutionalization of security and defence collaboration are made. The main 
aim for the ESS was in, time of the Iraq war, to reunite the main member states and redefine the 
narrative of EU external policy (Tocci, N. personal communication. July 13. 2017). Despite that 
those aims were achieved, it is evident it takes more to foster a common strategic culture. It 
needs a real grand strategy, which as shown in the analysis is more than just a threat assessment.  
A real grand strategy includes clearly defined tools and norms that facilitate the implementation 
of that strategy. These are the preconditions of a strategic culture and the ESS only started the 
first steps toward these conditions. According to the Dutch point of contact the EU strategic 
culture is still partly in its infancy (Claringbould, S. personal communication. June 21. 2017). In 
addition, Dr. Tocci argued that for the EU to have a strategic culture it starts with mutual solidarity 
for each other’s threat perceptions, because it is evident that these differ in such a diverse 
community as the EU. The EUGS is a starting point by creating common key priorities and a 
normative institutional framework to uphold the agreed upon set priorities.  
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Conclusion and Discussion   
 
Conclusion 
 
This research mapped out EU defence and security collaboration through the analysis of the EU 
strategies, key documents and expert interviews. To uncover the development of shared EU 
strategic culture. Because a common EU strategic culture can provide the shared framework that 
facilitate and ease strategic decisions. The urgency for shared decisions and action is pointed out 
by discussing the historical background of this cooperation and assessing the current security 
context. Strategic culture theory and constructivism provided the basis of the argument that 
shared norms, practices of institutions and understanding of threats are powerful drivers, which 
foster a strategic culture. However, the document analysis and expert interviews showed that EU 
is still in the onset of creating a shared strategic culture. In this research, it turns out that the ESS 
was the first real threat assessment and the EUGS is the first grand strategy of the EU. Despite 
the fact that not yet there can be spoken of a common strategic culture the EU made important 
steps with the EUGS and its key implementation documents. The coming years will show how 
the implementation of the EUGS turns out and if a higher degree of solidarity, unity and a common 
strategic culture are established in the EU 
 
Discussion 
 
European security and defence collaboration is a comprehensive subject, which can be 
compared to a ball of yarn. Every time you think you have the beginning of the yarn and working 
to the end you have to check again. In this research, difficult choices had to be made to keep it 
comprehensible. For future research, it is recommended to include the key council conclusion on 
ESS, EUGS and CSDP because in this research the political perspective is missing. However, the 
selection of documents used in this research provide a broad perspective on the policy side of 
the ESS, EUGS and CSDP.  Another crucial recommendation for future research is to assess the 
implementation phase of the EUGS according the analytical framework provided in this research. 
In the end the EU will keep progressing and developing in this field, because if one thing is certain 
it is that security will always be an issue that needs to be addressed.   
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Appendix A: Topic List 
 
Introduction: focus on the comparison of the two EU grand strategies on foreign affairs and 
security. To distinguish if the EU developed over the ten years a common strategic culture. These 
expert interviews should serve as an insight in the daily practice around the EU global strategy, 
the Common Security and Defence Policy and the existence of a common strategic culture in the 
EU. These questions serve as a guide for the interview, it is however possible to deviate from this 
set question in order to match more with the interviewee’s background or answers.  
 
Name respondent: 
 
Position respondent:  
 
Topic list in English:	
 
Expertise 
- Could you describe your role / involvement regarding The European Security Strategy, 
the European Global Strategy and / or CSDP? 
 
- Since when are you involved in this topic? 
 
 
- In which area of expertise are you the most experienced:  the ESS or EUGS (this will be 
more or less the focus of the rest of the interview)? 
 
Position from (expertise) organization 
- Could you describe from your organization / expertise point of view how the CSDP 
policy of recent years has been received? 
 
- Can you explain from your organization point of view how the new EUGS was received? 
 
- What is your role in relation to the EUGS and CSDP regarding its implementation? 
 
- How would you describe the EU's strategic culture? 
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       Drafting process EUGS / ESS 
- Can you explain from your expertise/ organization how the process of the creation 
of the EUGS / ESS went? 
 
- How where all Member States input tried to be included in the creation of the EUGS 
/ ESS? 
 
- What were the main points of your organization and role in the creation of the 
EUGS / ESS? 
 
- Can you describe what the role / position was from EU colleagues from other Member 
States? 
 
- What we’re regarding to these other EU colleagues the biggest similarities and 
differences with the point of view from the Netherlands / organization? 
 
Own perspective on European security integration strategic culture 
- How would you assess the success of European security and defence cooperation? 
 
 
- When in your opinion could be the EUGS seen as a successful strategy? 
 
- How do you see the future of European security and defence cooperation? 
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 Appendix B: Respondents list 
Respondents list  
Name of Expert Area Label - Affiliation 
Lt Gen (ret) Drs. A.G.D. Ton van Osch  
Former director general EU 
military staff perspective, 
Security Consultant Policy - Ministry of Defence & EU 
Martijn Hagoort 
Senior Policy officer - 
GVDB Policy - Ministry of Defence 
Georgina Earle 
Senior policy advisor – 
EU/GVDB Policy - Ministry of Defence 
Lilian Camerik 
Former director general EU 
military staff perspective, 
Security Consultant Policy - Ministry of Defence & EU 
Sachi Claringbould  
Senior policy officer 
Directorate-General for 
Political Affairs, Point of 
Contact EUGS Netherlands Policy - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Wouter van der Staaij 
Policy officer Directorate-
General for Political Affairs, 
Assistant of Sachi 
Claringbould 
(implementation EUGS) Policy - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Jean Pierre Vanaubel PMG chair Executive 
Dr. Margriet Drent  
Senior research fellow at 
Clingendael Institute  
International security, EU as 
Security Provider, Security 
Identity  Academic 
Dr. Nathalie Tocci 
Director of Instituto Affari 
Internazionale – advisor 
Frederica Mogeheirni – 
Executive EUGS  Academic - IT 
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Appendix C: Abbreviations 
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